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Policy is modeled as the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An 
election in jurisdiction A determines the composition of the legislature that selects a representative 
to negotiate an intergovernmental policy agreement with the representative from the legislature of 
jurisdiction B. Negotiations are modeled using Nash’s (1950) bargaining framework, modified to 
account for a simultaneous legislative ratification vote. Though agreements favor the legislative 
representative least willing to compromise, agreements between the bargainers may not follow the 
ordering of the parties’ ideal policies. An electoral outcome where support for the center party 
comes from extreme voters may emerge.  
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Many policies are the outcome of negotiations between different centers of power
1 [Breton 1996]. 
Indeed, such balancing was a guiding principle in the framing of the US constitution. And even the 
most reform minded government member arriving newly elected in the capital finds an entrenched 
bureaucracy ready to skillfully channel, if not outright stymie, attempts to change the status quo. 
Intergovernmental negotiations between two jurisdictions may be explicitly negotiated or the link 
may be “strategic”, with policies chosen independently, but in reference to each other. With 
heterogeneous parties and voters’ preferences differing across jurisdictions, voters in one jurisdiction 
do not expect the ruling party of the other jurisdiction to represent their interest. Recognizing the 
interdependence of policy formation, voters should choose a government that will negotiate the best 
possible policy, rather than vote for the party closest to their own preferences.  
We study voting decisions in a model where two three-party parliamentary legislatures jointly 
make policy decisions. In our model intergovernmental negotiations are carried out by the ruling 
parties/formateurs representing each jurisdiction with their agreement subject to a legislative 
ratification vote. With concurrent elections in two jurisdictions being rare, we focus on elections in 
one jurisdiction and take as given the formateur in the other and the existence of a status quo policy. 
Our model applies broadly to any two jurisdictions, but we refer to Federal and sub-national State 
legislatures in our analysis. 
In the first of four stages, citizens vote in the State election. The State formateur—chosen 
according to vote shares—engages in policy negotiations with its Federal counterpart. Negotiations 
are carried out using Nash’s [1950] bargaining model where failure to reach an agreement leaves the 
status quo in place. Finally, the agreement must be simultaneously ratified and the status quo 
                                                      
1 Negotiations between France first with Britain then with Germany lead to the 1986 Single European Act [Moravcsik 
1991]. Negotiations between national and sub-national jurisdictions regularly occur in Canada [Simeon 1972], in the 
United Kingdom [Robbins 1998], and in the United States [Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997]. 
  1remains in force if ratification fails in any legislature
2.  
We show that electoral outcomes are in general affected by a formateur’s/party’s willingness to 
compromise. The reason is simple. When choosing among the three State parties, policy-oriented 
voters must rank-order the agreements they anticipate will be reached by each pair of Federal and 
State formateurs
3. Since the agreement lies between the ideal policies of the corresponding pair, the 
choice of State formateur determines the set of policies over which actual negotiation takes place. 
The location of the agreement depends on the formateurs’ willingness to compromise, a property of 
their utility functions. In accordance with Cressman and Gallego [2005], we show the following. 
When parties have quadratic utility functions, the ordering of agreements and parties’ ideal policies 
coincide. However, when one of the extreme parties is substantially more willing to compromise 
than the others, the orderings differ. The supporters of this extreme party are moderate rather than 
“extreme” voters. 
Many political economy models use quadratic utilities to obtain explicit solutions to their 
problem. But in doing so—as Cressman and Gallego show—these models implicitly assume the 
rank-order of the parties’ ideal policies, their agreements and the left-right ordering of parties 
coincide. However, Cressman and Gallego show that the ordering of ideal policies and agreements 
may not coincide. This suggests that voters should rank parties not by their ideal policies but instead 
by the policies they can deliver. 
Our goal is to show that even under very strong simplifying assumptions—a single isolated 
election, complete information, a unidimensional policy, identical party systems in the two 
                                                      
2 Failing a vote of confidence may lead to early elections. In our single-election model votes of confidence are irrelevant. 
But ratification plays the role of a confidence vote. On votes of confidence see e.g. Diermeier and Feddersen [1998]. 
3 Intergovernmental policy making has been studied in two-tier two-party systems. Alesina and Rosenthal [1995, 1996] 
and Dixit and Londregan [1998] model policy as an exogenous compromise between the policies of two governments. 
While this assumption is reasonable in their models, it is inappropriate when intergovernmental bargaining takes place 
between two three-party legislatures. Models that endogenize intergovernmental negotiations include Crémer and Palfrey 
[2000, 2002, 2003] on federal standards; Persson and Tabellini [1996] on risk sharing and redistribution between two 
regions of a Federation; and Mo [1995] on international bilateral agreements. 
  2jurisdictions and formateurs selected by vote shares (proportional representation)—the requirement 
to negotiate makes predicting the rank-order of the intergovernmental agreements and the 
consequent electoral outcome a less than straight forward exercise. Under Nash bargaining the rank-
order of agreements depend on the entire preference profile of all parties. Our set-up brings out the 
crucial role that two fundamental characteristic of the bargainers’ preferences play in negotiations: 
the party’s ideal policy and its willingness to compromise. The party’s ideal policy represents the 
policy the formateur wants to implement when there is no need for compromise. In bargaining 
situations, however, the formateurs’ willingness to compromise also influences their agreement. 
Consequently, even though policies are one dimensional, parties are not. Policy-oriented voters take 
these two “dimensions”—the ideal policy and the willingness to compromise—into account. We 
conclude that non-myopic voters understand the art of compromise among inter-jurisdictional 
formateurs and incorporate this into their voting decisions. 
Since voters balance the tendencies of the formateur in the other jurisdiction instead of voting 
for the party with ideal policy closest to their own, on the surface, voters appear to misrepresent 
their preferences. But this differs fundamentally from the more widely discussed “strategic voting” 
in which voters attempt an implicit coalition to rally support behind an “electable” party or 
candidate. Here, proportional representation allows voters to support the party they truly most 
prefer to see elected—they simply do so recognizing that the party will not dictate policy, and so do 
not focus exclusively on a party’s ideal policy. Consequently, the dependence of final policy on the 
choice of formateur may change the voters’ effective left-right ordering of parties. 
The resulting extensive game has a unique sequential Nash equilibrium which has a simple and 
intuitive structure. As usual, policy depends on the State election, the legislative (majority/minority) 
status of the formateurs, their preferences and the location of the status quo. In addition, we show 
vote balancing occurs as some change their ballot if the Federal formateur or the status quo changes.  
  3At the ratification stage, the Federal and State formateurs/agenda setters [Romer and Rosenthal 
1978] make a joint proposal to their corresponding legislatures in a "bicameral" setting
4. We 
introduce a ratification stage and omit the legislative bargaining stage
5 for two reasons. With final 
policy being the outcome of intergovernmental negotiations and ratification, bargaining within the 
legislature only determines the range of policies over which the formateurs negotiate. With complete 
information and no shocks, policies acceptable to a legislative majority at the legislative bargaining 
and ratification stages concur. In our model, it is ratification and not legislative bargaining that 
matters. In consequence, we opt for the simpler model. Moreover, ratification makes formateurs 
accountable to the legislatures. Without ratification in a single-election model the formateurs would 
implement their preferred agreement as there is no punishment for doing so. 
In our model, each formateur has veto powers with the legislative ratification veto player 
depending on the identity of the formateur. This accords with Diermeier and Myerson’s [1999] 
finding that in bicameral settings the best organizational structure includes each chamber delegating 
bargaining to a player with veto powers followed by a free vote on the proposal for each member in 
the legislature. In our model, it is parties and not individual members who vote in the legislature. 
Once the parties have been rank ordered by their potential intergovernmental agreements, the 
electoral game is similar to that found in a single-level three-party legislature
6. There are many three-
party unicameral voting models (see Footnote 5). To simplify the analysis we adopt Austen-Smith’s 
[2000] voting game and use his results to determine electoral outcomes in our model.  
                                                      
4 The following is well known for bicameral systems. Bicameralism introduces balancing into policy making [for an 
excellent review of this literature see  Tsebelis and Money 1997]; diminishes the power of the agenda setter(s) as 
proposals acceptable to one chamber must survive alternatives in the other [Levmore 1992; Riker 1992a,b]; and prevents 
the tyranny of the majority [Buchanan and Tullock 1962]. In accordance with these authors, we show that for minority 
governments, the parties that are needed for ratification may force moderation in intergovernmental negotiations. 
5 Unicameral legislative bargaining models include: Austen-Smith and Banks [1988], Austen-Smith [2000], Banks and 
Duggan [2000], Baron [1998], Baron and Diermeier [2001], Baron and Ferejohn [1989], Bloch and Rottier [2002], 
Diermeier and Merlo [2000] and Morelli [1999]. 
6 Introducing more than three parties in each legislature can be done at the expense of making the ratification vote more 
complex. Since this detracts from the main point of the paper, we use the simpler three-party model.  
  4II.  THE MODEL 
Two governments represented by a (F)ederal and a (S)tate legislature must negotiate a policy 
agreement that they take to the legislatures for ratification. We assume there exists a “status quo”
 7 
policy Q that will remain in force if either legislature fails to adopt a revised policy. We model this 
situation as a multistage game. Policy, denoted by θ, is unidimensional and assumed to lie on the 
interval [0,1] (as does the status quo Q). The set of players consists of the (L)eft, (C)enter, and 
(R)ight parties acting in each legislature, and a large number of heterogeneous voters. The voters’ 
ideal policies are distributed on the policy space according to Γ . Preferences are assumed to be 
strictly concave over policy outcomes,  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ θ . For a given policy θ that is implemented, player i 
whose ideal policy is   receives a payoff of   i ˆ θ
) ˆ | ( u ) ( u i i i θ θ = θ . 
We assume that voter preferences satisfy Greenberg and Weber’s [1985] Consecutiveness Condition 
(CC): for any three voters j, k and m and any two policies   
1 0   θ < θ














ˆ   ˆ ˆ   such that k    all for ) ( u ) ( u then
) ( u ) ( u   and ) ( u ) ( u if
θ < θ < θ θ > θ
θ > θ θ > θ
i.e., if voters j and k prefer   to  , so does every voter in between.  
1  θ
0  θ
We assume the Federal and State levels have the same party system
8 and no distinction is made 
between the party and its appointed negotiator
9. Like voters, parties are characterized by ideal 
policies,   for  . To bring out the role and importance of the party’s willingness to 
compromise on the electoral outcome we refrain from making assumptions that guarantee 
agreements follow the ranking of the parties’ ideal policies. Assuming party preferences satisfy a 
j ˆ θ } R , C , L { j∈
                                                      
7 Assuming a status quo is not restrictive since “no policy” can itself typically be represented as some specific point on 
the unit interval. The status quo may be the previous period’s agreement in a repeated game (not modeled here). 
8 We consider the effect of relaxing this assumption in Section V.  
  5single-crossing property such as the consecutiveness condition is tantamount to assuming the 
ranking of agreements and ideal policies coincide. 
We believe parties are long-lived institutions so that in a single election model party preferences 
should be taken as given
10. We assume parties have concave preferences (with different ideal policies 
where L’s is to the left of C’s to the left of R’s,  ). We also assume that parties 
may differ in their willingness to compromise (a property of their utility functions). For example, 
when parties have quadratic preferences the ordering of their ideal policies extends to all policies 
since in this case preferences satisfy the consecutiveness condition (CC); and ensures R is as willing 
as L or C to agree to a rightward shift in policy for   (see example given in Figure I). As 
illustrated is Section IV, however, when we vary one party’s preferences by changing its concavity 
equilibrium voting outcomes change
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 R C L ≤ θ ≤ θ ≤ θ ≤
L ˆ θ < θ
11. 
Figure I about here 
II.1    Timing 
Four subgames comprise the policy revision process: the State election, the selection of negotiators, 
the intergovernmental policy negotiation, and finally the ratification vote in each legislature. All 
references to elections are implicitly those at the State level. 
Given the status quo   and knowing the identity (F) and degree of legislative control of the 
Federal government, in the first stage citizens simultaneously vote to elect a State government. 
Voters must anticipate each party’s behavior in post-election negotiations and ratification vote, and 
Q
                                                                                                                                                                           
9 Not unreasonable as strong party discipline is exercised in parliamentary democracies [Laver and Shepsle 1996].  
10 We concentrate on how the party’s willingness to compromise affects electoral outcomes and refrain from studying 
how parties chose their preferences. Snyder and Ting [2002] argue that party’s preferences should be taken as given 
because they represent a brand name that voters can easily identify. In their model, candidates preferences may differ 
from the party they become affiliated with but they run under the party’s brand name not their own preferences. 
11 Parties may differ in their willingness to compromise for many reasons that depend on the historical development of 
the party and on its membership. Given our assumption that parties are long-lived institutions we do not explain here 
how this characteristic of their utility function is determined but show instead that electoral outcomes depend on it.    
  6these depend on the party’s preferences over all outcomes. Since we assume complete information, 
the only credible platforms are the parties’ true preferences, denoted  ) u , u , u ( U R C L = . The election 
determines the vote shares  , which, under proportional representation, 
represent the weight each party receives in the legislature.  
} R , C , L { j ], 1 , 0 [ V
j ∈ ∈
After the election, the State formateur is selected according to party’s vote shares. When party j 
wins a simple legislative majority,  , it becomes formateur. When no party wins a simple 
majority, a formateur is randomly chosen according to vote shares
2 / 1 V
j ≥
12. Next the Federal and State 
formateurs engage in intergovernmental negotiations, modeled as Nash [1950] bargaining, where 
failure to agree leaves the status quo in place. If an agreement is reached, to become policy it must 
be simultaneously ratified by both legislatures; otherwise the status quo prevails.  Given final policy 
, payoffs are realized, and the game ends.  * θ
 
III.  EQUILIBRIUM 
The equilibrium involves a number of cases associated with the various combinations of the preset 
variables   and  . However, many of these are qualitatively similar, and in particular, 
one half are simply “reflections” of the other, depending on the location of Q. To remove these 
reflections we assume  . We find the subgame perfect equilibrium solving backwards 
through the stages of the game. 
} R , C , L { F∈ Q
] ˆ , 0 [ Q C θ ∈
III.1  The Ratification Equilibrium 
At the ratification stage, parties know Q, the election outcome, the formateurs and their legislative 
status. Let   represent the policy agreement subject to ratification (where FS identifies the pair of 
Federal and State formateurs). With only two policy choices and parties having identical preferences 
FS a
  7across jurisdictions, no party can gain by voting for different policies at the Federal and State 
levels
13, so we need only consider a representative legislature, h=F, S. Each party  R , C , L j∈  
compares the payoff from ratifying and from vetoing the agreement  . For any Q, let 
denote the (convex) upper contour sets of formateurs F and S, the set of 
policies that make party j no worse off than Q. 
FS a
)} Q ( u ) ( u | { ) Q ( j j j ≥ θ θ = Φ
A ratification equilibrium is a triple of mutual best-response, weakly undominated legislative 
voting strategies. Let   be the equilibrium policy in legislature h. An agreement 
takes affect when ratified by both legislatures: 









  S F, h for    a * θ   only if   and   if   a




FS FS . 
When a party holds a majority, it only ratifies policies it prefers to Q. When no party holds a 
majority, a legislative coalition is required. Thus, a viable policy must lie in the upper contour sets of 
formateur j and at least one of the other two parties. Summarizing: 
Given the status quo   and the intergovernmental policy agreement  , the 
equilibrium ratification function in legislature h,   is as follows: 
] ˆ , 0 [ Q C θ ∈
FS a
) U | Q , a ( *
FS
h θ
(i)   If party j holds a majority in legislature h,  
) Q ( a   if only    and   if    a * j
FS FS
h Φ ∈ = θ . 
(ii)  If no party holds a majority in legislature h,  
j i   for   ) Q ( ) Q ( a   if only    and   if   a * j i
FS FS
h ≠ Φ ∩ Φ ∈ = θ . 
 
III.2 The  Intergovernmental  Bargaining  Equilibrium 
When bargaining, each formateur knows the identity of its counterpart and the composition of both 
                                                                                                                                                                           
12 Diermeier and Merlo (2004) find strong empirical support for random rather than deterministic selection. 
13 To see this note that given the vote of the other parties, j’s vote matters only when j is ratification pivotal, that is, if j’s 
vote determines whether aFS is ratified in at least one legislature. Suppose that aFS passes the vote in one legislature, and 
that j is pivotal in the other. When aFS gives j a higher payoff than Q, j’s best response is to vote for aFS in the legislature 
in which its vote is pivotal. Voting for aFS at the other level does not change the ratification outcome since j was not 
pivotal in that legislature. Casting identical votes in both legislatures does not change the ratification outcome so that j 
votes in identical manner in both legislatures. When j is pivotal and j gets the same payoff from both policies, we assume 
j breaks the tie in favor of the formateur in that legislature. 
  8legislatures. With complete information they rationally anticipate whether their agreement is ratified. 
Thus they only “agree” to a non-ratifiable policy if one or both prefer the status quo. Two cases can 
be distinguished.  
Case 1. When the same party holds power in both jurisdictions, there is no disagreement on the 
best policy, so this is not a bargaining problem in the sense of Nash [1950]. However, the party must 
take account of the ratification round, so simply proposing its ideal policy may lead to rejection 
when some other compromise it prefers to the status quo would have been ratified. In such cases, 
the party proposes the policy it most prefers subject to that policy being ratifiable. If the party is L it 
can count on unanimous support for policy changes rightward from Q. If  , it can safely 
propose its ideal; otherwise, C and R ensure the status quo   remain in force. If the party is C, it 
can count on R supporting a move to  . If the party is R, it must attract either C or L. Which it 
chooses depends on which party is willing to move the greatest distance towards R’s ideal before 





14. Define the upper bound of party j’s acceptable set 
 as  ) Q ( j Φ j θ . Summarizing,      
Given the status quo   and the rationally anticipated ratification function,   if the 
same party j forms government in both legislatures then 
] ˆ , 0 [ Q C θ ∈ * θ
(i)  when j holds a majority in each legislature,  ,  j
FS ˆ *) a ( * θ = θ











R j if } ˆ }, , {max{ min 
C j if ˆ
L j if } Q , ˆ { max 







Case 2: When different parties become formateurs there is disagreement over which of the 
feasible policies is best. Since formateurs have equal "bargaining power"
15 we will use jk to denote 
                                                      
14 We note that unless we assume party’s preferences satisfy a single-crossing property, R may form a ratification 
coalition in the legislature with L rather than C.   
15 Unequal bargaining power, as in Roth [1979], would give the formateurs different weights in the Nash product below. 
  9the pair of formateurs disregarding which jurisdiction they represent. The three jk,  k j≠ , 
configurations are LC, LR or CR.  We model negotiations using Nash’s bargaining framework, 
where Q represents the “threat point” with disagreement outcome . The 
situation is not completely standard since negotiators are constrained by the ratification vote. 
Fortunately things are somewhat less complicated than they first appear. When both formateurs 
hold majorities, ratification is guaranteed, and we are in the standard model. But even when one or 
both do not hold a majority, if they find a policy that mutually improves on Q they form a legislative 
coalition that ensures its ratification
)) Q ( u ), Q ( u ( ) Q ( D F S
FS =
16. Interestingly, ratification only constrains negotiators when 
they do not face "true" bargaining situations (i.e. in Case 1). 
The bargaining set is the set of utilities pairs over which the formateurs negotiate, given by
17
)} Q ( ) Q ( a | ) a ( u ), a ( u { ) Q ( B k j k j
jk Φ ∩ Φ ∈ = . 
The bargaining set   and the disagreement point   define the bargaining problem. 
Among the many bargaining solutions
) Q ( B
jk ) Q ( D
jk
18, we use that proposed by Nash [1950]. For any  , 
the Nash Bargaining Solution maximizes the product of the utility gains from the disagreement 
point, i.e. solves 
) Q ( A a
jk ∈
)] Q ( u ) a ( )] Q ( u ) a ( ) Q | a ( NP max k j kj
a
− − = k j [u [u . 
Under the assumptions on utilities there is a unique solution to the Nash Bargaining problem.   
  Since the Nash solution is Pareto optimal and Pareto dominates  , not every point on the 
frontier of  is a candidate. First assume that  . For  , both parties prefer 
rightward changes in policy (e.g., the lower upward sloping segments in Figure II). When   
Q
) Q ( B
jk
j ˆ Q θ < ) ˆ , Q [ a j θ ∈
) ˆ , Q [ a j θ ∈
                                                      
[2005]. For an excellent discussion on various solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem see Thomson [1994]. 
16 Again, this relies on the assumption parties are identical in both legislatures. See Section V.  
17 With concave utilities, this set is convex, closed, and bounded.  
18 The results are qualitatively similar if we use instead the Kalai-Smorodinsky [1975] solution. See Cressman and Gallego 
  10and  j k ˆ θ ≤ θ , both prefer agreements to left of  j θ  (e.g., the top upward sloping segment in Figure 
2(a)). In this case the set of potential agreements is  . When   and  ] ˆ , ˆ [ k j θ θ ) ˆ , Q [ a j θ ∈ j k ˆ θ > θ  (e.g., 
Figure 2(b)), this set is smaller, restricted to  ] , ˆ [ j j θ θ . Thus, the set of mutually acceptable policies is 
}] ˆ , min{ , ˆ [ ) Q ( A k j j jk θ θ θ = . When instead  j, no agreement is a Pareto improvement on the 
status quo
ˆ Q θ >
19, and thus  .     Q ) Q ( A jk =
Figure II about here 
  Below we describe the nature of the agreements reached under Cases 1 and 2 to examine the 
effect party preferences have on voters’ behavior (we further illustrate our results in Section IV with 
examples). For now, we summarize with the observation that 
 
Proposition 1: Given the Federal formateur F and the status quo  , 
intergovernmental negotiations lead to a unique ratifiable agreement. 
] ˆ , 0 [ Q C θ ∈
 
 
For Federal formateur F, let   be the set of ratifiable 
agreements. 
*)} a ( * *), a ( * *), a ( * { *
FR FC FL F θ θ θ = Θ
The results of Sections III.1 and III.2 are in the spirit of Romer and Rosenthal [1978] and 
Denzau and Mackay [1983]. In Romer and Rosenthal’s seminal paper, the agenda setter’s proposal 
must pass an electoral referendum. In Denzau and Mackay, a committee—a subset of the 
legislature—makes a proposal to its parent body. Both show, as we do, that under complete 
information and a closed rule
20, some alternatives to the status quo—including compromises the 
setter/committee accepts to gets its proposal approved—are viable but the status quo may also be 
difficult to change. Neither paper, however, explores the consequences of this on the initial choice 
of agenda setter or committee members.  
                                                      
19 This trivial case is also not a bargaining problem in the sense of Nash [1950].  
  11III.3  Selection of the State Formateur 
su ature and the selection of the State formateur is by vote 
≥ = μ
−
otherwise   V
2 / 1 } V { max   if   0
j
j j . 
III.4  The State Election 
know the preferences of each party, the identity and majority/minority 
proportional to their vote shares and that voters are 
indi
We as me that representation in the legisl
share. When  2 / 1 V
j ≥ , j forms government with probability one. When no party wins a majority, j 
forms government with probability 
j V . The probability of j becoming the State formateur is 






At the electoral stage, voters 
status of the Federal formateur and the location of the status quo. Given complete information they 
can rationally anticipate the final policy resulting from any particular election outcome. Voters can 
then rank-order parties by their associated intergovernmental policy agreements (see additional 
discussion on policy rankings in Section IV).  
The fact that parties gain representation 
vidually insignificant immensely simplifies the election process. Random selection eliminates 
“strategic voting” for the type of electoral coordination present in plurality rule elections where a 
voter’s perception of how likely a party is to garner the most votes affect their choice of whom to 
support. With random selection, an individual’s vote increases the likelihood of any party forming 
government by an equal amount, so there is no benefit to coordination. This rules out 
considerations that emanate from the electoral rather than the policy process. Given the rank-order 
of intergovernmental agreements, the underlying voting model here is very similar to Austen-Smith 
[2000], to which we refer the reader for a more formal demonstration of our key result.  
A voting equilibrium is a symmetric probabilistic voting strategy,  * π  such that for all
                                                                                                                                                                          
  ] 1 , 0 [ ˆ
i ∈ θ  
 
20 Under a closed rule, no legislative amendments to the proposal are allowed. 
  12given Q, F, U, and the set of anticipated ratifiable equilibrium agreements  ,  
 for j = L, C, R, is weakly undominated and maximizes i’s expected payoff. 
*
F Θ
) U , F , Q | *) a ( * ( *
Fj
i θ π
Proposition 2 (Lemma 4, Austen-Smith 2000) Given the Federal formateur F, the 
status quo  , and the set of anticipated ratifiable equilibrium agreements  , if 
 is a voting equilibrium, voter of type i votes with positive probability only for the party 
that offers the highest payoff conditional on that party being selected as the State formateur.  




That is, voters act as “Nash random dictators”. They vote as if their ballot determines the electoral 
outcome, supporting the party whose selection as formateur leads to the ratification most preferred 
outcome among those obtainable. Of course, it is possible that this choice is not unique, in which 
case voters are assumed to vote for the party whose ideal policy most closely resembles their own.  
The equilibrium is characterized by the existence of two unique marginal voter types 
 partitioning the space of preferences into supporters of the three parties. The strategies 
of the voters, together with the ratification strategies and negotiation stage equilibrium constitute the 
unique sequential equilibrium of the entire game.   
*) *, (
CR LC ν ν
 
IV.  COMPARATIVE STATICS 
From the previous section we know that voters must rank parties by their anticipated ratifiable 
agreements. The electoral equilibrium depends then crucially on this ranking. The usual assumption 
in the literature—either in the form of a single-crossing property or technical assumptions on the 
party’s utility functions—guarantees the ranking of agreements and the party’s ideal policies 
coincide. Below we show an example where this is the case. However, we also show an example 
where the ranking of agreements differs from that of the party’s ideal policies. We emphasize that 
under Nash bargaining the willingness to compromise of all parties influences bargaining outcomes 
and the ranking of agreements, i.e., the party’s willingness to compromise represents another 
  13dimension along which voters distinguish parties and effectively determines their left-right ordering 
of parties. To illustrate the importance of the party’s willingness to compromise on the electoral 
outcome we show the voting equilibrium when we change only one party’s utility function. We 
begin by showing strategic voting – vote balancing – occurs in our model. 
IV.1  Quadratic Party Preferences: Changes in the Status quo 
The following examples illustrate that vote balancing occurs under complete information. This 
happens as changes in the status quo affect the set of feasible intergovernmental agreements which 
in turn affect electoral outcomes. We assume the ideal points of the voters are distributed to 
approximate a uniform distribution on the zero-one interval and that the ideal policies of the parties' 
preferences are  ,  , and  . Given this, were voters to vote for the party whose 
ideal policy is closest to their own, the election would lead to the following partition of voters: 
0 ˆ
L = θ 2 / 1 ˆ
C = θ 1 ˆ
R = θ
  R party  for    vote 1)   (0.75,
C party  for    vote ) (0.25,0.75
L party  for    vote ) 25 . 0 , 0 (
. 
To fix ideas, assume R holds a majority in the Federal house. This means that for each example 
below there are five State electoral outcomes: R wins a majority, R wins a minority, C wins a 
majority, L wins a majority, and L wins a minority. The remaining possibility that C wins a minority 
adds nothing, since an agreement acceptable to C will always attract the support of R. 
Table I about here 
Table I gives the equilibrium agreements for the State formateurs under majority and minority 
governments for Q=0 and Q=0.25 and the voting equilibrium. Notice that the agreements favor the 
left-most formateur
21 and, because of the quadratic preferences, follow the ordering of the parties’ 
ideal policies. 
Example 1: Q=0. Since the status quo is at L's ideal policy, if L gains control of the State 
  14legislature, L proposes the status quo. In contrast, C and R prefer changes to the status quo. Case (i) 
and (ii) have the same outcome since for Q=0, C is indifferent between the status quo and R's ideal 
policy. In case (iii) the agreement maximizes   in the Pareto set  . For cases (iv) 
and (v) L ensures that its most preferred policy, the status quo, prevails. 
) Q | a ( NPCR ) Q ( PO
CR
In the Nash equilibrium, each citizen votes for the party that, conditional on being selected 
formateur, would negotiate the ratifiable outcome  ) the voter most prefers.  L gets 30.5% 
of the vote, C 49.5%, and R 20%. Comparing this to the outcome when everyone votes for the party 
whose ideal policy is closest to their own, it is clear that C still receives approximately the same vote 
share, and a substantial chance of forming government. But those supporters are drawn from a more 
right-leaning segment of the electorate. L's prospects improve and R’s diminishes as voters balance the 
influence of R's control of the Federal house.  
* a ( *
FP θ
                                                                                                                                                                          
Example 2: Q=0.25. Again L only agrees to the status quo. However, C's "power" is now 
increased. If C becomes the State formateur it negotiates an agreement it prefers relative to that in 
Example 1. Also, if R fails to form a majority, C can use its veto power to restrain R from imposing 
its ideal policy  . In contrast to Example 1, ratification binds when R gets a minority.   R ˆ θ
In equilibrium, L gets 41% of the vote, C 25%, and R 34%. So, both extreme parties benefit 
electorally at the expense of center party from the rightward movement of Q. Intuitively, with Q 
being less extreme, the influence of the ratification vote, forces State party R to credibly moderate 
the extreme tendencies of its colleague, the Federal formateur R. C's "right-wing" vote moves to 
support R. Simultaneously, voters hesitant to let extreme party L negotiate, are now less worried 
about the result of the (inevitable) deadlock. 
IV.2  Changes in one party’s willingness to compromise 
This sub-section illustrates how changing the preferences of one party—changes in the party’s 
 
21 Typically, the closer a party’s ideal is to the status quo, the closer will be the final agreement to the party’s ideal.    
  15willingness to compromise—affects intergovernmental agreements and electoral outcomes. In these 
examples, Q=0, R holds a majority in the Federal house, and parties’ ideal policies are  , 
, and  . While C and R retain their quadratic utility functions, L’s changes to 
 where n = 1, 2, 3. 
25 . 0 ˆ
L = θ
33 . 0 ˆ
C = θ 1 ˆ
R = θ
n 2
L ) a 25 . 0 ( ) a ( u − − =
We note that even though there is no risk in our model—we assume complete information and 
there are no shocks to any of the parameters of the model—as n increase so does the concavity of 
L’s utility function. As Peters [1992] shows, this implies as n increases L’s strength of preference 
weakens, i.e., L’s willingness to compromise increases
22. Using these utility functions, Table II shows 
that all parties prefer to change the status quo and that agreements favor the left-most formateur. 
Table II about here 
Example 3:  . The equilibrium agreements between all pairs of formateurs 
follow the ordering of the parties’ ideal policies. 
2
L a) 25 . 0 ( (a) u − − =
Example 4:  . With L more willing to compromise than in Example 3, in 
equilibrium, the agreement between L and R is more centered than when all parties have quadratic 
preferences and are equally willing to compromise. Voters are then less concerned with voting for L. 
With no change in the agreement between C and R, R maintains its vote share. Thus, L gains votes 
at C’s expense. 
4
L a) 25 . 0 ( (a) u − − =
Example 5:  . L is now substantially more willing to compromise than the 
two other parties. The ordering of the agreements between pairs LR and CR is the reverse of that in 
Examples 3 and 4. L’s greater willingness to compromise makes L less tough in negotiations. 
12
L a) 25 . 0 ( (a) u − − =
                                                      
22 Peters [1992] defines a strength of preference relation as follows. For a player facing four choices  , let the 
binary relation 
A } d , c , b , a { ∈
* f be a complete transitive binary relation on A×A. If (a,b)  * f (c,d), then the player prefers the change 
from b to a to the change from d to c, i.e., for utility function u,  ) d ( u ) c ( u ) b ( u ) a ( u − > − . Peters proves that for two 
players the utility function of the player with the weaker strength of preference relation is a concave transformation of 
the other player's utility. In our current example this means that L’s strength of preference weakens as n increases. 
  16Consequently, when L faces R rather than C, the agreement between L and R is closer to R’s ideal 
policy than that between C and R. With complete information and voters caring only about final 
policy outcomes, C’s supporters are those to the left of 0.427. Mid-range voters vote for L. L gets 
12% of the vote, C 42.7% and R 45.3%. 
Examples 4 and 5 show that rational policy-oriented voters take into account not only the ideal 
policies of the parties (the distance between their ideal policies to be precise) but also the party’s 
willingness to compromise since these determine the ranking of agreements. The ranking of policies 
in Examples 1 to 5 can be explained using the results of Cressman and Gallego [2005]. They show 
that in Nash bargaining environments where a player’s opponents are identical in every respect 
except for their ideal policies and their disagreement outcomes—as is in our model—the opponent’s 
strength of preference as measured by the concavity of the player’s utility function determines 
whether the ranking of agreements coincides (the opponent’s utility function exhibits increasing 
absolute risk aversion) or is the reverse (opponent’s utility exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion) 
of the ranking of party’s ideal policies. They argue that in this type of bargaining environment 
strength of preferences matters (the environment ceases to be one of ordinal domains) and that 
interpersonal comparisons are possible (Nash's [1950] scale invariance axiom no longer holds: 
Thomson [1994]). Moreover, Peters [1992, p. 1018] states "in a model without lotteries, it is 
incorrect to explain theoretical results by referring to the risk attitude(s) of the decision makers".  
We emphasize that our findings are related to L’s willingness to compromise and not to L’s aversion 
to risk since there is no risk in our model.
23
Our result on L’s willingness to compromise is also related to the results of Kannai [1977], 
Kihlstrom et al. [1981] and Roth [1979] that in a riskless environment with risk-averse players, the 
                                                      
23 Note that the party’s wiliness to compromise also determines the location of the policy that keeps party L and C 
indifferent to the status quo, i.e., of  L θ  relative to  C θ , in Case 1, Section III.2 associated with Proposition 1 and 
determines ratification partners in each legislature. 
  17Nash solution is characterized by the least “risk-averse” agent obtaining a larger share of the pie. As 
L’s willingness to compromise increases, L agrees to a policy that is further from its ideal policy. 
  
V.   EXTENSIONS 
We have assumed throughout that there are only three parties, each represented in both 
jurisdictions.  Suppose instead that Federal and State levels have different party systems. Then we 
must define upper contour sets more generally as  ) Q ( F j Φ  and  . When only the formateur j in 
h=F,S is in a minority position, policy is ratified iff   for  . If both lack 
majorities, the agreement is ratified if four parties concur. To a large extent, this modification results 
merely in more cumbersome notation. It makes ratification constraints more likely to bind, but does 
not fundamentally alter the need for voters to consider parties’ willingness to compromise. 
) Q ( S j Φ
) Q ( ) Q ( a h h j i
FS Φ ∩ Φ ∈ j i ≠
In an earlier version we modeled intergovernmental negotiations using Binmore, Rubinstein and 
Wolinsky’s [BRW 1986] extension of Rubinstein [1982] alternating offers game where negotiations 
may exogenously breakdown after any rejection
24. In this extension, if the time between periods and 
the risk of breakdown are not small there would be two policies associated with each formateur. More 
cases need then to be considered when ranking intergovernmental agreements, and ratification 
constraints are also more likely to bind. Voters, however, must still consider the parties’ willingness 
to compromise in their decisions, and our primary results would remain qualitatively unchanged.  
If the two levels have different party systems, the results of our model are relevant even when 
there are two parties at each level. Effectively, such a system has four parties, and so no single party is 
likely to find itself able to dictate policy changes. Thus, the model captures the essence of the trade-
off faced by voters in the US, where national and state parties, though bearing the same label, 
                                                      
24 BRW demonstrate the direct correspondence between the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium of the alternating 
offers game when the time between periods and the risk of breakdown become small and the associated Nash [1950] 
  18typically differ in ideal policies and willingness to compromise, as do candidates in Congressional 
and Senate elections.  
The model also can be reinterpreted by identifying F with an incumbent president during 
midterm elections or with an entrenched bureaucracy: in each case voters may choose 
representatives that they would hesitate to set up as dictators, but whom they anticipate will achieve 
beneficial compromises in negotiations with the powers that be. 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
Even in the an otherwise simple environment —a single isolated election, complete information, a 
unidimensional policy, identical party systems in the two jurisdictions and formateurs selected by 
vote shares (proportional representation)—the requirement for governments to negotiate policy 
agreements means that knowledge of the ideal policies of parties do not provide voters with 
sufficient information to cast their ballots. More knowledge is necessary for voters to rank parties 
and so for observers to predict electoral outcomes: the parties’ willingness to compromise, captured 
by the relative concavity of their utility functions, must also be understood.  
The extensive form game we study has a unique sequential Nash equilibrium that has a simple 
and intuitive structure. In equilibrium, policy depends on the outcome of the State election, on 
majority/minority status of both formateurs, on the concavity of the party’s preferences, on the 
distance between the party’s ideal policies and on the location of the status quo. When the same 
party controls both houses, if at least one does not control a majority, the ratification vote imposes 
moderation on the formateurs. When the status quo is to the left of C’s ideal policy, if formateurs 
differ but L is one of them, either L gets its ideal policy ratified or the status quo remains in place. If 
the formateurs differ and parties have identical preferences at Federal and State levels, they control 
                                                                                                                                                                           
bargaining solution. Here we use Nash’s bargaining framework rather than BRW to simplify the analysis. 
  19the majorities to ratify their agreement. However, if party’s preferences differ across jurisdictions, 
ratification may constrain negotiations. Vote balancing occurs, as some voters change their ballot if a 
different Federal formateur or a different the status quo were in place. 
Our analysis shows that legislative veto players, parties needed for legislative ratification, may 
exert a moderating effect on intergovernmental agreements. In our model it is voters and not the 
formateurs who choose the legislative veto player. This contrasts with Mo [1995] where one of the 
negotiators chooses a veto player to convey information to its opponent. 
In accordance with Kannai [1977], Kihlstrom et al. [1981] and Roth [1979], we find that 
intergovernmental negotiations favor the formateur least willing to compromise. However, in a three 
party setting as the willingness to compromise of one of the extreme party’s increases, the ordering 
of intergovernmental agreements may not follow the ordering of the parties’ ideal policies. Non-
standard voting patterns emerge where the center party’s support comes mainly from voters who 
under normal orderings vote for one of the extreme parties. 
Our model also provides some additional insight to those of Romer and Rosenthal [1978] and 
Denzau and Mackay [1983]. In our model, political competition forces voters to rank agreements. 
Since the ordering depends on the party’s wiliness to compromise, so do electoral outcomes. Non-
standard voting outcomes emerge; something that remains hidden under a single setter/committee. 
The assumption of quadratic preferences—widely used in political economy models because they 
guarantee the ranking of agreements and the party’s ideal policies coincides—allows researchers to 
concentrate on other more salient issues in their models. However, as our paper shows in electoral 
outcomes with policy negotiations the outcome crucially depends on the bargainers’ willingness to 
compromise. Thus, in this type of models adopting quadratic preferences can be misleading since a 
full analysis would show that non-standard legislative coalitions and electoral outcomes may emerge. 
There is no reason to impose on the model a given left-right partition of voters among parties. Our 
  20model shows that the left-right ordering of parties even in unidimensional policy space depends on 
more than just the party’s ideal policies.  
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24(a) Formateurs L and C. (b) Formateurs L and R.
Figure II. The bargaining sets between L (horizontal axis) and C (IIa) and
R (IIb) (vertical axis). In (a) the policy that keeps L indi⁄erent to the status quo
Q = 0, ￿L does not constrain negotiations since b ￿C = ￿L = 0:5. There are two
upward sloping segments in the bargaining set. The bottom ones are for policies
in [Q; b ￿L), both formateurs prefer rightward policy changes that increase their
payo⁄s. The top one in (b) is for policies in (b ￿R;￿L], both formateurs prefer
leftward policy changes that increase their payo⁄s. In (b) ￿L = 1, the point
where it constrains negotiations, i.e.,￿L = b ￿R. The downward sloping portion




Table I  
Changes in Q for quadratic preferences and ideal policies at  ,  , 
 
0 ˆ




State Formateur  Example 1: Q=0  Example 2: Q=0.25 
(i) R Majority  1 ˆ a R
RR = θ =   1 ˆ a R
RR = θ =  
(ii) R Minority  1 a C
RR = θ =   75 . 0 a C
RR = θ =  
(iii) C Majority/minority  61 . 0 a
RC =   57 . 0 a
RC =  
(iv) L Majority  0 Q ˆ a L
RL = = θ =   25 . 0 Q a
RL = =  
(v) L Minority  0 Q ˆ a L
RL = = θ =   25 . 0 Q a
RL = =  
  Voting equilibrium  Voting equilibrium 
 
R for    vote (0.80,1)
C for    vote ) 80 . 0 , 305 . 0 (
L for    vote ) 305 . 0 , 0 (
 
R for    vote (0.66,1)
C for    vote ) 66 . 0 , 41 . 0 (





Table II  
Changing L’s Willingness to Compromise  
C and R with quadratic preferences and  ,  ,   and    25 . 0 ˆ
L = θ 33 . 0 ˆ
C = θ 1 ˆ














L a) 25 . 0 ( (a) u − − =
(i) R M
1 1 ˆ a R
RR = θ =   1 ˆ a R
RR = θ =   1 ˆ a R
RR = θ =  
(ii) R m
1 66 . 0 a C
RR = θ =   66 . 0 a C
RR = θ =   66 . 0 a C
RR = θ =  
(iii) C M/m  419 . 0 a
RC =    419 . 0 a
RC =   419 . 0 a
RC =  
(iv-v) L M/m  322 . 0 a
RL =   374 . 0 a
RL =   434 . 0 a
RL =  
  Voting equilibrium Voting equilibrium  Voting equilibrium 
 
 R for   vote   (0.54,1)
 C for   vote   ) (0.37,0.54
 L for   vote   (0,0.37)
 
 R for   vote   (0.54,1)
 C for   vote   (0.4,0.54)
 L for   vote   (0,0.4)
 
 R for   vote   (0.547,1)
 L* for   vote   47) (0.427,0.5
 C * for   vote   (0,0.427)
1 M = Majority; m=minority.   
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